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Abstract. In this paper, we are interested in understanding the interre-
lationships between mainstream and social media in forming public opin-
ion during mass crises, specifically in regards to how events are framed
in the mainstream news and on social networks and to how the language
used in those frames may allow to infer political slant and partisanship.
We study the lingual choices for political agenda setting in mainstream
and social media by analyzing a dataset of more than 40M tweets and
more than 4M news articles from the mass protests in Ukraine dur-
ing 2013-2014 — known as "Euromaidan" — and the post-Euromaidan
conflict between Russian, pro-Russian and Ukrainian forces in eastern
Ukraine and Crimea. We design a natural language processing algorithm
to analyze at scale the linguistic markers which point to a particular
political leaning in online media and show that political slant in news
articles and Twitter posts can be inferred with a high level of accuracy.
These findings allow us to better understand the dynamics of partisan
opinion formation during mass crises and the interplay between main-
stream and social media in such circumstances.
1 Introduction
Social media have become a crucial communication channel during mass political
or civic events by shaping "a civic and democratic discourse in a vacuum of
opportunities" [17]. As academic debates contest the nature of social media as
an alternative public sphere [22], it is important to study the interrelationships
between mainstream media and social networks in shaping public opinion during
mass protests, especially in regards to the origin and dissemination of news
frames [20]. It is also of interest to consider how propaganda and manipulation
in the information sphere work: where partisan language and frames originate,
how they spread, and whether there are certain markers that would allow to
trace the distribution and paths of such content.
In this study, we analyze the role of social and mainstream media in shap-
ing and disseminating partisan content frames during social unrest and crisis.
Specifically, we focus on the mass protests in Ukraine during 2013-2014 - known
as "Euromaidan" - in which social media played a remarkable role, helping to
raise awareness, cover, and discuss ongoing events; and the post-Euromaidan
Russian occupation of Crimea and the conflict between Russian, pro-Russian
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
05
81
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 16
 M
ar 
20
17
2and Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine (2014-2015), periods that were charac-
terized by a parallel information and propaganda war occurring in mainstream
media and online together with military action on the ground.
We explore the extent to which lingual choices in online discourse can illu-
minate the partisan confrontation between political factions during mass crises
through the analysis of the two complementary datasets of Twitter posts and
news articles. More specifically, we exploit natural language processing to single
out language that points to a particular political leaning and to observe whether
these markers are detectable in both mainstream media language and social
media posts at scale. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We exploit the word embedding approach [18,19] to identify the indicators of
partisan slant in news articles and validate it over the text corpora of around
4M news articles collected during the Ukrainian conflict. Our analysis reveals
a strong use of highly polarized partisan content frames in news articles on
both sides of the conflict.
– Next, we design a machine learning approach for detecting the markers of
partisan rhetoric in news articles with minimal efforts required for supervi-
sion. This is achieved by a "coarse-grained" labeling of the articles based on
the partisan slant of the news agencies they originate from. Our approach
- trained on a collection of articles from 15 representative news agencies -
is able to achieve 60–77% accuracy in distinguishing between the news arti-
cles with pro-Ukrainian, Russian pro-government and Russian independent
slants during the Ukrainian conflict.
– Finally, we study the inter-relation between traditional and social media dur-
ing conflicts through an analysis of individual news sharing patterns among
Twitter users and find that most of the users are exposed to a variety of
news sources but with a strong partisan focus. Using our machine learning
approach, we are also able to predict the partisan leaning of Twitter users
from the content of the tweets with an accuracy up of 70%.
In summary, we demonstrate that studying the lingual choices of Twitter
users and news media adds a new dimension to understanding the dynamics of
information flows and partisan idea dissemination in the space between social
networks and mainstream media. We also demonstrate that lingual choices-based
machine learning models can be highly effective at automatically predicting the
political slant of mainstream media and Twitter users, which can have serious
implications for political expression in repressive and authoritarian regimes.
2 Related Literature
Computational social scientists have given substantial attention to the main-
stream and social media activity around political and social change, and to the
role information shared on these platforms plays in influencing political and so-
cial agendas, protest movements and events, and public opinion. Researchers
have explored the role of social media and mainstream media actors in informa-
tion diffusion and protest message amplification in networks through the prism
3of the collective action theory [14], as well as the role of social networks in re-
cruitment and mobilisation during protest, revealing connections between online
networks, social contagion, and collective dynamics [15].
A broad swathe of quantitative studies have focused on determining the fac-
tors that influence political leanings of social network users and metrics that
allow to classify and predict this kind of political bias. Several studies have con-
sidered the predictive power of political news sharing habits on Twitter [3], the
influence of partisan information sharing on political bias among Facebook users
[5] and Twitter actors [16,11], and compared differences and biases in news story
coverage, dissemination, and consumption among online mainstream and social
media [9]. Others have noted the difficulty of connecting selective exposure to
political news on Facebook to partisanship levels of users [4]. At the same time,
researchers suggest that analysis of information consumption and distribution
habits of social network users does provide data on media exposure, the relation-
ship between various classes of media, and the diversity of media content shared
on social networks [2].
Some studies have noted that reliably inferring the political orientation of
Twitter users and generalizing the findings is notoriusly difficult due to it being
one of the “hidden” attributes in social network data and due to differences be-
tween politically active groups of users and the general population [10]. However,
other academics suggest that studying some relationships on social networks, like
the co-subscriptions relationships inferred by Twitter links [1], allows for some
understanding of the underlying media bias — and subsequently, political bias
— of social network users. Another study showed that applying machine learn-
ing techniques to classify political leanings on Twitter based on political party
messages can reveal partisanship among users [7]. A number of studies present
a comparison between the predictive power of the users’ social connections and
their content sharing patterns for inferring political affiliation, ethnicity identi-
fication and detecting affinity for a particular business [23,24].
While the research described above uses a fairly large spectrum of methods
to study, classify and find connections between social media users’ behavior and
their media and political preferences, most of the studies referenced employ social
network analysis or related methods, focusing on relationships between actors or
their behaviors within the network, such as sharing links, following other actors,
etc. More recent studies have used computational methods to assess forms of
political organization on social media [6], employed machine learning models
to classify rumor and misinformation in crisis-related social media content [28],
and used deep neural networks to identify and analyze election-related political
conversations on Twitter on a longitudinal scale [26].
We propose augmenting these approaches with a focus on the linguistic vari-
ables present in the data, and using natural language processing and machine
learning techniques to gain further insight into how political and ideological mes-
sages travel between mainstream and social media, and how these lingual choices
reflect the partisan nature of mainstream media outlets and, subsequently, social
media users and their content consumption and sharing habits. Such an approach
4would allow for a more granular understanding of how language changes allow
to detect both important events and partisan leanings in mainstream and social
media data.
3 Background and Datasets
The Euromaidan protests and subsequent political crisis are the outcome of a
continuing trend in the post-Soviet arena. The last decade or so has seen an
increase in mass protest actions in the region, with protests erupting in Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine, etc. From the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine to the Bolot-
naya rallies of 2011-2012 in Moscow to the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, a
gradual increase in the use of digital technologies and media platforms by citizens
has become evident [13,20,21]. At the same time, the region is characterized by a
problematic media climate, with mainstream media often co-opted or controlled
by the state or the oligarchy. The interplay and mutual influence of mainstream
and social media emerge as crucial for understanding the political and civic
developments in the region and thus demand more scholarly attention.
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Fig. 1: Description of the Datasets. The Twitter dataset was collected via
Twitter Streaming API (spikes in daily volume correspond to higher discus-
sion volumes around Ukraine-related topics, February-March is the most active
phase of the protest, spike in July corresponds to the MH17 airplane tragedy);
the News-RU dataset was crawled from the news.Rambler.ru news aggregator
website (periodic pattern reflects the weekly cycle); and the News-UA dataset
was provided by the developers of the Kobzi mobile app.
A number of researchers have already examined some of the more general as-
pects of Euromaidan, such as the reasons for the protest [12], who the protesters
were [27], how the protest came together and evolved [21]. However, few have
investigated the use of civic media by Euromaidan participants beyond simply
saying that social media were used in the protest as ‘tools’ for mobilization and
information dissemination [21]. A deeper and more large-scale analysis of the
5relationship between mainstream media coverage of the crisis and the grass-
roots social media data around the political unrest, enabled by computational
and big data tools and complemented by qualitative analysis, could reveal more
about how the partisan agenda during the protests was formed and transformed
through lingual choices and memorable memes, and who was able to exert influ-
ence on the lingual frames used by the multitudes of social media users and media
outlets. Such investigation could also shed light on the reasons and mechanisms
of the information war between Ukraine, Russia, and the West that gained in
scale after the Euromaidan protests shifted into the crisis characterized by Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea and the pro-Russian uprising in eastern Ukraine.
To research these questions in this paper we analyze two complementary
datasets: A social media dataset which consists of over 40M tweets collected for
the three most prominent hashtags during and after the Euromaidan protests
- #euromaidan #ukraine #kyiv (and their Ukrainian and Russian equivalents)
via Twitter Streaming API and a dataset of more than 4M news articles col-
lected from a large Russian news aggregator (Rambler.ru) and its Ukrainian
counterpart (smartphone app Kobzi). All three datasets were collected in the
period between December 2013 and July 2014. The parameters of the datasets
are summarized in Fig. 1.
4 Exemplar indicators of partisan slant
4.1 Methodology
Our initial interest in exploring the lingual choices made by mainstream media
sources and social media users was sparked by observing the emergence of a
number of memes and buzzwords introduced during the events. In this section,
we aim to measure the presence of these keywords in the rhetoric of the parties
involved in the conflict and explore the extent to which this analysis can be
automated.
To analyze the lingual choices of online media sources during the Ukrainian
conflict we first exploit the word embedding methodology proposed in [18,19].
The proposed approach devises vector representations of words by analyzing the
textual context in which they appear. This is achieved by training a model which
for a given word, represented by a vector Xi, aims to infer the most likely 2× j-
surrounding words vectors which constitute the lingual context where the word
was used 1, e.g, f(Xi) = (Xi−j , ..., Xi−1, Xi+1, ..., Xi+j). Intuitively, semantically
closed words are expected to appear in similar contexts and so should produce
similar outcomes when applied as the arguments of the function f(X). Thus, if
trained on a significantly large text corpus the algorithm is able to assign close-
by vectors to the words with similar meanings, thereby providing a powerful
framework for analyzing the semantics of the word choices.
Equipped with the Word2Vec implementation2, we build word representa-
tions for the textual corpora extracted from our datasets. Note that we mainly
1 We used the Skip-Gram model as it provided more interpretable results.
2 Gensim natural language processing library https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/
6focus on vector spaces extracted from the news corpora (News-UA and News-
RU) as Twitter’s limit of 140 characters significantly constrains the applicability
of this approach. In pre-processing, we remove rare words with less than 10 occur-
rences in each of the corpora and end up with a dictionary of 87K words trained
from a content corpus of 600M words. Note that while the Ukrainian media
space is generally bilingual, in our analysis we only focus on Russian-language
news articles, in order to allow for a fair cross-comparison of the results, i.e., we
focus on the Russian-language media sphere as it presents a sufficient diversity
of news sources, with political views spread across the spectrum, ranging from
pro- to anti-Kremlin and from pro- to anti-Ukraine, including both Ukrainian
and Russian media outlets.
4.2 Mining semantics of word choices
In Table 1 we present several examples of word associations which were mined
from both our news corpora. We pick several loaded terms which were the promi-
nent indicators of partisan rhetoric during the conflict and match these words to
the most similar ones according to the trained Word2Vec dictionaries (as mea-
sured by the cosine similarity). The results illustrate that the trained model cor-
responds to our understanding of the semantics of chosen terms. For instance, the
word referendum (референдум), frequently used in the context of the Russian-
backed annexation referendum in Crimea, lies very close to its synonyms, e.g.,
‘plebiscite’, ‘voting’, etc., in the devised vector space in both the News-RU and
News-UA corpora, from both sides of the conflict.
On the other hand, we also notice that some of the synonyms discovered
by Word2Vec reflect the propagandistic rhetoric of official Russia and Ukraine
during the conflict. For instance, in the News-UA corpus (but not in the News-
RU corpus), the word referendum (референдум) is associated with the words
‘non-legitimate’ and ‘fake referendum’, and reflect the official Ukrainian state’s
position on the plebiscite. Similarly, the word aggressor (агрессор) as used in as-
sociation with Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea is associated with
the words ‘cynical’ and ‘unprovoked’ and captures the attitude of the Ukrainian
government in regards to the events.
A similar partisan rhetoric is also observed in Word2Vec word representations
mined from the Russian news corpus (News-RU). For instance, we observe that
the loaded term junta (хунта), which was extensively used by some Russian
media sources to demonize the transitional government formed in Ukraine after
the Euromaidan protests, is strongly associated with the words ‘neo-fascist’ and
‘pro-Ukrainian’ in the Russian news corpus (News-RU). Similarly, the word pun-
isher (каратель) which was used by some Russian media sources to label the
Ukrainian Armed Forces and their operations in the conflict in eastern Ukraine is
closely associated with ‘fascism’ and ‘terrorize’, as well as with Stepan Bandera,
a controversial figure who has been acknowledged by some in the new Ukrainian
government.
Such biased lingual choices are in alignment with recent findings that politi-
cally charged rhetoric and biased language were central to the discourse around
7the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the subsequent conflict in eastern
Ukraine, both of which featured interference by Russian political forces [25,29].
News-RU
каратель [punisher] хунта [junta]
бандера [Bandera 3] 0.79 восстание [uprising] 0.76
безоружный [unarmed] 0.79 проукраинский [pro-Ukrainian] 0.72
расстреливать [shoot] 0.77 неофашист [neo-fascist] 0.72
терроризировать [terrorize] 0.77 неонацист [neo-Nazi] 0.71
оккупант [invader] 0.76 путчист [coupist] 0.71
фашист [fascist] 0.76 самозванец [imposter] 0.71
News-UA
референдум [referendum] агрессор [aggressor]
псевдо-референдум [fake referendum] 0.72 неспровоцированный [unprovoked] 0.72
плебисцит [plebiscite] 0.71 враг [enemy] 0.70
голосование [voting] 0.67 циничный [cynical] 0.66
автономный [autonomous] 0.66 развязанный [launched] 0.66
нелегетимный [non-legitimate] 0.64 извне [external] 0.65
присоединение [attachment] 0.63 оккупационный [invasive] 0.65
отсоединение [separation] 0.62 террор [terror] 0.64
Table 1: Examples of word embeddings mined from the news datasets
during the Ukrainian conflict. The table presents the word associations
mined using the Word2Vec algorithm for several loaded terms (bold font) in
Russian (top) and Ukrainian (bottom) news.
5 Identifying Slant of News Stories
Inspired by the observations from the previous section we next question the
power of the word choices to characterize the difference in partisan media at scale,
i.e. are the linguistic choices of partisan media substantially different such that
we can automatically differentiate them? We address this question by developing
a classification machine learning model and conducting an extensive validation
of the model over our news datasets.
5.1 Methodology
Using the Word2Vec word representations from the previous section, we train a
supervised learning algorithm to find the best indicative words which character-
ize the language style of a given party. To this end, we first manually classify the
Top-30 most popular Russian news agencies4 as having a strong pro-government
3 Stepan Bandera - the leader of the western Ukrainian resistance during World War
II, accused by Soviets of collaborating with Nazis.
4 as ranked by the Medialogia rating agency http://goo.gl/JNvx0Y
8or opposition slant and complement this list by the Top-5 Russian-language
sources from the Ukrainian internet segment. We achieve this by manually ex-
amining 20 or more articles per each news source for qualitative signs of slant,
and by investigating public ownership records and publicly available info about
the media outlets, their owners and affiliations. While granular and manual, such
an approach can be replicated in other studies using media sources, as public
ownership records are usually available and provide enough context for classifica-
tion, while manual examination for signs of slant is based on a designated set of
relevant keywords. We also remove all neutral sources from our analysis, i.e those
that have not indicated a particular partisan slant. Finally, we only consider news
articles related to the Ukrainian unrest and conflict5. Our classification results
in three categories of media outlets: UA, RU-ind, and RU-gov, exhibiting pro-
Ukrainian, Russian-independent and Russian-pro-government points of view on
the Ukraine unrest and conflict respectively.
Next, we cluster the Word2Vec vectors obtained from the previous section,
and use the produced clusters as a feature space to describe the content of each
article. In more detail, we apply k-means clustering with N = 1000 clusters to
the word vectors of the combined News-UA and News-RU corpus. Then, for
each article we calculate a 1000-items long feature vector X that represents the
normalized frequencies of occurrences of words from each cluster that occur in
the article, and train a function f(X)→ {RU−gov,Ru−ind, UA} to identify the
partisan slant of the article (e.g., whether coming from Russian pro-government
(Ru-gov), Russian independent (RU-ind) or Ukrainian (UA) news source6).
word ρsw ρ¯sw News source
ъ [Ъ] 0.38 1.0 Ъ-Kommersant
m24.ru [m24.ru] 0.30 1.00 Moscow 24
известиям [izvestiam] 0.31 0.93 Izvestia
господин [gentlemen] 0.29 0.79 Ъ-Kommersant
подробнее [more] 0.36 0.69 Ъ-Kommersant
рбк [RBC] 0.27 0.68 RBC
Table 2: Exemplar markers of individual news sources as identified by the
words with the highest relative frequencies ρ¯sw across all words and news sources.
5.2 Reducing news source bias
One crucial aspect to account for in the proposed approach is its ability to learn
linguistic patterns that generalise across all news sources of a given partisan
slant, rather than markers of individual news outlets. Since the training data
in the above method is sourced from a selection of few news sources, without
a generalisable approach, the classifier could simply learn to label the partisan
5 This is achieved through filtering the corpora by the relevant keywords, i.e., "kyiv",
"ukraine", "donbass", "maidan", "crimea", "luhansk", "dnr" and "lnr". Adding a
wider set of keywords had little effect on improving the recall of filtering.
6 We refer to each of these three classes as ‘party’ or ’parties’ in the rest of this paper.
9slant of an article based on unique words, or news source markers, that are
specific to a particular biased news source.
For example, it is common that the name of the news source or its corre-
spondents are explicitly mentioned in the byline or text of the article, making it
easily distinguishable among other texts. Supposing the training data contains
a biased Russian pro-government news source B whose name appears in every
article from B, we might learn a model that the word B is indicative of a Pro
Russian-government partisan slant. Although this is useful to classify other arti-
cles from B, it does not help identify other pro-russian news sources or articles.
We therefore need to adapt the method to learn labels that generalise to all news
sources by ignoring news source markers.
Description of the problem. To show that news source markers are indeed
widespread among the news articles in our dataset, we measure the relative
frequencies of words appearing in articles from each individual news source.
More formally, we define the frequency ρsw =
Nsw
Ns
of word w in news source s
as a share of all articles Ns from news source s in which word w appears at
least once and compare it to the sum7
∑
s∈S ρ
s
w of the observed frequencies of w
across all news sources s ∈ S, i.e., we define the ratio ρ¯sw = ρ
s
w∑
s∈S ρsw
to identify
words which are highly unique to particular news sources.
The top news source markers are extracted as the words with the highest ratio
ρ¯sw across all words and all news sources. Table 2 shows the top few markers.
As expected, we observe that articles from some of the news sources - such
as Ъ-Kommersant, Moscow 24, Izvestia, and RBC - contain very vivid word
markers of that news source. For instance, the words "Ъ" and "m24.ru" used as
abbreviations of the Ъ-Kommersant and Moscow 24 news papers appear only
within the news articles originating from these two sources. More interestingly,
we observe a very high relative frequency of mentioning other general words such
as "господин [gentlemen]" and "подробнее [more]" in articles originating from
Ъ-Kommersant, suggesting that there might be other word markers – beyond
just the obvious names of newspapers – which indicate the writing style of an
individual news source.
Metric RU-gov vs.RU-ind
RU-gov vs.
UA
RU-gov vs.
RU-ind vs. UA
Precision 0.66 0.78 0.57
Recall 0.65 0.77 0.60
Accuracy 0.65 0.77 0.60
Table 3: Predicting partisan slant in news articles. The results of a su-
pervised machine learning experiment to identify whether news articles were
published by either a Ukrainian (UA), a Russian pro-government (RU-gov) or
Russian independent (RU-ind) news agency.
7 Note that this is equivalent to using the mean
∑
s∈S ρ
s
w
|S| , since the sum for all words
is computed over the same set of sources S.
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Suggested solution. To eliminate the aforementioned news source bias in our
prediction model we develop the following approach8. We use Random Forest
classifiers known for a good performance on modeling high dimensional data and
modify the underlying mechanism for constructing individual decision trees. By
default, the trees of the Random Forest algorithm are constructed via a greedy
search for the optimal split of the training data D which minimizes the entropy
of the label classes (i.e., parties in the conflict), i.e.,
minimize
split
Ht(Dleft) +Ht(Dright) (1)
where the entropy Ht(D) = −
∑
t∈T ρ
D
t log(ρ
D
t ) is defined on the label spaces
t ∈ T in the left Dleft and the right Dright branches of the split (ρDt indi-
cates the share of instances of class t in the dataset D). In principle, an op-
timal split by this definition may be found around the word markers specific
to individual news outlets (e.g., the one from Table 2). To penalize this un-
wanted behavior of the algorithm we introduce the entropy of a news source
s as Hs(D) = −
∑
s∈S ρ
D
s log(ρ
D
s ) which - unlike the entropy defined on labels
Ht(D) - characterizes the purity of the split in terms of news sources s rather
than parties t (i.e., ρDs indicates the share of instances from news source s in
the dataset D). Intuitively, we aim for a split that discriminates by the party t
but not by the news source s and, so, we aim to find the split that minimizes
the entropy Hp(D) while preserving a high entropy of individual news sources
within the party Hs(D), i.e.:
minimize
split
Ht(Dleft) +Ht(Dright)− α(Hs(Dleft)−Hs(Dright)) (2)
where α is a constant controlling the effect of the proposed adjustment9.
5.3 Cross-source validation
In summary, we represent each article as a 1000-long feature vector X based
on relative word frequencies corresponding to N=1000 clusters induced by a
Word2Vec representation of the entire news corpus. We then learn a function
f(X)→ {RU − gov,Ru− ind, UA} that labels the partisan slant (Russian pro-
government (Ru-gov), Russian independent (RU-ind) or Ukrainian (UA) news
source), whilst at the same time ensuring (using Eq. 2) that the model f(·)
generalises beyond learning to distinguish markers specific to individual sources.
To properly validate the proposed approach we conduct a cross-source valida-
tion as follows. From the news agencies labeled in the previous step we select all
8 We note that a straightforward approach of removing the most prominent news
source markers – as measured by the relative frequency introduced in the previous
section – has proved to be inefficient for the considered classification problem. In
contrast, the method we introduce in the rest of this section provides a more nuanced
approach in estimating the relevance of each classification feature.
9 The proposed approach was implemented by adapting the internal implementation
of the Random Forest algorithm from the open source scikit-learn libary.
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with at least 329 articles resulting in a dataset of five agencies from each party.
The number of articles from each news agency is balanced by down-sampling
the over-represented agencies. We further conduct a five-fold cross validation
such that at each step we pick four news agencies from each class to train the
classifier and use the remaining one for testing. Since we test the model over
a news agency which has not been used for training we are able to control for
over-fitting to the writing style and markers of specific outlets.
In Table 3 we report the average values of accuracy, precision, and recall of
the proposed cross-source validation. The results in the table indicate a strong
prediction performance of the algorithm (accuracy of 77%) in classifying the
content of the news articles as coming from Russian pro-government or Ukrainian
news sources. This result confirms a sharp difference in the linguistic choices
characteristic for the content of Russian and Ukrainian news articles as observed
in Table 1 of the previous section. More interestingly, the accuracy is also high
(i.e., 66%) for the more difficult problem of distinguishing between Russian pro-
government and Russian independent news sources which often shared a common
view on individual episodes of the conflict (e.g., the annexation of Crimea). For
the more general problem of discriminating between all three groups of news
agencies, the algorithm is able to achieve an accuracy of 60%. Note that this
is significantly better than a na¨ıve baseline of randomly guessing between the
three classes (with expected accuracy of 33%) signifying the presence of a sharp
partisan slant in traditional media.
6 Understanding partisan slant in Twitter
Having studied the difference in linguistic choices characteristic for news agen-
cies during the Ukrainian conflict we now switch to the analysis of the related
discourse in social media. The focus of our analysis is on understanding the inter-
relation between the level of exposure to different news sources among Twitter
users and the linguistic choices in their posts.
6.1 Methodology
To analyze the level of exposure to various news sources among Twitter users,
we rely on an established approach in the literature [3,7] and look at the news
sharing patterns. To this end, we identify 248K Russian-language tweets which
retweet or mention articles from one of the Y = 22 most popular news agencies
classified in one of the three groups in our dataset (e.g., whether coming from
Russian pro-government (RU-gov), Russian independent (RU-ind) or Ukrainian
(UA) news sources). Next, we measure the user focus on a partisan media and a
specific news agency by computing the share of the articles he/she shared from
his/her most preferred agency/party, correspondingly. We note that a similar
approach has been previously used to analyze geographic bias of content access
in social media [8].
More formally, for each user, we measure the number of times ny she/he
shared an article from a news source y ∈ Y and calculate the user’s news focus
12
as the share of all times he/she has shared any news article from any news source
in Y , i.e., β = maxy∈Y
(
ny∑
y∈Y ny
)
. The larger β is, the larger the fraction of the
user’s shares that come from a single source. Similarly, we measure the user’s
party focus βparty as the fraction of news articles shared from one of the three
“parties”: Russian pro-government (RU-gov), Russian independent (RU-ind) or
Ukrainian (UA) news sources. Finally, we measure the diversity of news sources
with which the user expressed alignment by computing the cardinality of the
subset Yny>0 of all sources in Y from which a user has shared at least one
article, i.e., γ = |Yny>0|.
6.2 Patterns of news sharing
The results of the analysis are presented in Fig. 2. Firstly, we note that for the
majority of users, less than half of all their shares come from a single news source
(Fig. 2, left) and that the majority of users express alignment with more than
6 news sources (Fig. 2, middle). At the same time, we note that although more
active users tend to focus more of their shares on a single news source, they also
(occasionally) share a bigger number of news sources (as indicated by the higher
diversity values for the users with more than 50 and 100 tweets in Fig. 2.middle).
However, this diversity of news sources is not seen when we look at the more
coarse-grained picture at the level of ’parties’ (Fig. 2, right): users’ shares tend
to be heavily focused on just one party – on average, more than 85% (90% for
the very active users) of the shares of a user are for news sources in alignment
with that user’s main ‘focus’ party. In other words, although users exhibit so-
phisticated behaviours such as a relatively high level of diversity in sharing from
multiple news sources, most of these sources have a single partisan alignment,
whether Independent Russian, Pro-Russian, or Pro-Ukrainian Government. Fur-
thermore, both the variety of news sources and the partisan focus increase as
user activity levels (number of tweets made) increase.
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Fig. 2: Partisan news focus among Twitter users. Distributions of (left)
the user focus on preferred news sources; (middle) the diversity of news sources
a user has expressed alignment with; (right) the user focus on partisan media.
6.3 Predicting political slant from Twitter posts
Next, we attempt to draw the link between news exposure among Twitter users
- as inferred by the news articles they share - and the language they use in
13
their posts. From the results of the analysis in the previous section, we build
on the fact that the vast majority of users have a strong partisan focus in the
article they share and use that as a label of their political slant. To understand
whether and to which extent the language choices in Twitter posts can indicate
the political slant of the users we formulate a machine learning classifier to infer
the latter from the former and validate it over our Twitter dataset.
To this end, we focus on the 5.9K users with at least 5 tweets, at least 3 of
which contain news sources and balance the dataset by choosing an equal number
of users from each party. To predict political slant of a Twitter user we formu-
late a supervised machine learning problem where we model language in a user’s
tweets with a feature vector X, using a methodology similar to the one described
in the previous section, and train binary classifiers f(X)→ {RU−gov,RU−ind}
and f(X) → {RU − gov, UA} to identify whether a user is predominantly ex-
posed to Russian pro-government (RU-gov), Russian independent (RU-ind) or
Ukrainian (UA) news sources. Note that we remove all tweets that contain head-
lines of news and all retweets when constructing the language model of a user
X. This ensures that we concentrate on the lingual choices in the tweets origi-
nating from the user, rather than the messages/sources that he/she (re)tweets.
Also, as in the previous section, we only consider Russian-language tweets from
Russian-speaking Twitter users, to ensure a fair comparison across all sides of
the conflict. However, note that a large number of Ukrainian tweets are also in
Russian, and our dataset contains representation from all three parties.
Metric RU-gov vs.RU-ind
RU-gov vs.
UA
RU-gov vs.
RU-ind vs. UA
Precision 0.66 0.71 0.52
Recall 0.66 0.70 0.52
Accuracy 0.66 0.70 0.52
Table 4: Predicting partisan slant in Twitter. The results of a supervised
machine learning experiment to identify partisan slant among Russian-speaking
Twitter users during the Ukrainian conflict.
Table 4 presents the averaged results of the 10-fold cross-validation of the
proposed model. We note that the model has good performance, achieving an av-
erage accuracy of 70% and 66% in distinguishing between the users with RU-gov
vs. UA slant and between the users with RU-gov vs. RU-ind slant, correspond-
ingly. Comparing these results with the results for predicting the slant of news
articles (Table 3), we note that the performance of RU-gov vs. RU-ind classifier
is comparable between the two cases whereas the performance of RU-gov vs.
UA classifier as well as the three-class classifier (accuracy of 52% in comparison
to expected 33% for a random baseline) is slightly lower for the Twitter case.
This can be probably attributed to the fact that the size of the text piece in
an average news article is larger than in a collection of ten 140-character-long
posts collected for a median Twitter user in our training and testing sets and,
so, inferring political leaning from Twitter posts seems to be a harder problem
than it is for news articles.
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7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this study we investigated the linguistic indicators of partisan confrontation
in mainstream and social media during times of political upheaval by analyz-
ing a dataset of more than 40M tweets and more than 4M news articles from
the mass protests in Ukraine during 2013-2014 — known as "Euromaidan" —
and the post-Euromaidan conflict between Russian, pro-Russian and Ukrainian
forces in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. We designed a natural language processing
algorithm to analyze at scale the linguistic markers which point to a particular
political leaning in online media and showed that partisan slant in news articles
can be automatically inferred with an accuracy of 60–77%. This difference in
language in traditional news media is reflected in the word choices made by the
supporters of similar partisan bent on Twitter — those who tweet news sources
of a particular slant can be identified with an up to 70% accuracy based on their
lingual choices in tweets other than the retweets of particular news sources. Our
results have two implications:
First, our results contribute to the debate on the role of lingual choices in
traditional and social media in fostering political frames and partisan discourse
during political crises, and confirm that both traditional news sources and users
on social media are identifiably partisan. It would be interesting to conduct a
more general study into whether the reinforcing partisan nature of the discourse
and the political divisions we observe arise from a general lack of empathy and
trust in conflict situations, or whether this is specific to the Ukraine conflict.
Second, the results reveal the extent to which partisan rhetoric and political
leanings can be automatically inferred from lingual choices, which has implica-
tions for the use of social media as a safe platform for free speech in dangerous
conflicts. Furthermore, we are able to infer all this with only a “coarse-grained”
approach: The party labels (i.e., pro-Ukrainian, Russian pro-government or Rus-
sian independent) are assigned to the news articles (or social media profiles)
based on the polarity of the news agencies they originate from/retweet. The
advantage of this approach is that it requires minimal manual efforts — it only
requires to label the political slant of a number of news agencies (such as the 15
considered in this paper). However, the polarity and partisan rhetoric of articles
may also vary between different topics and authors within a single news source,
which we do not directly account for. We partially address this concern in the
current paper by focusing only on the articles related to the Ukrainian events
which are known for highly polarized rhetoric in both Russian and Ukrainian
online media [25,29]. Although we settled on the coarse-grained approach as a
proof-of-concept model, it is clear that a more fine-grained approach could allow
for greater accuracy in identifying partisan tweets and political leanings of users
and news media.
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